The inversive congruential method is an attractive alternative to the classical linear congruential method for pseudorandom number generation. The authors have recently introduced a new method for obtaining nontrivial upper bounds on the multidimensional discrepancy of inversive congruential pseudorandom numbers in parts of the period. This method has also been used to study the multidimensional distribution of several other similar families of pseudorandom numbers. Here we apply this method to show that, "on average" over all initial values, much stronger results than those known for "individual" sequences can be obtained.
Introduction
Let q be a (large) prime power and let IF q be the field of q elements. For given α ∈ IF * q , β ∈ IF q , let ψ be the permutation of IF q defined by
Let u 0 (ϑ), u 1 (ϑ), . . . be the sequence of elements of IF q obtained by the recurrence relation u n+1 (ϑ) = ψ (u n (ϑ)) , n = 0, 1, . . . ,
where u 0 (ϑ) = ϑ is the initial value. It is obvious that the sequence (2) is purely periodic with some least period t ≤ q. It is known when such sequences achieve the largest possible period t = q (see [1, 9, 21] ). Two types of sequences of pseudorandom numbers can be derived from the sequence (2) : inversive congruential pseudorandom numbers (see Section 3) where q is a prime p and digital inversive pseudorandom numbers (see Section 4) where q is a power of a small prime.
The inversive congruential generator provides a very attractive alternative to linear congruential generators and has been extensively studied in the literature. For sequences of inversive congruential pseudorandom numbers of period t = p, a number of results about the distribution and statistical almost-independence of inversive congruential pseudorandom numbers over the full period have been established, starting with the paper [18] . Many of these results are essentially best possible. We refer to [5, 6, 7, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23] for more details and references to original papers.
In [27] we introduced a method which allowed us to give the first nontrivial bounds on the one-dimensional discrepancy of an individual sequence of inversive congruential pseudorandom numbers in parts of the period. In [14] this method was extended to the multidimensional discrepancy. In [24] similar results were obtained for sequences satisfying the relation u n+1 (ϑ) = f (u n (ϑ)) with a polynomial f (X) ∈ IF p [X]. In the series of papers [12, 13, 14, 23, 25, 26, 29, 30, 31] this method was successfully applied to many other similar generators; see also the recent survey [28] and the paper [2] where the method is analyzed in the more general setting of arbitrary finite abelian groups.
In the very special but important case for cryptographic applications where f (X) = X e , that is, for the power generator , alternative approaches have been proposed in [10, 11] . These approaches, although they have produced quite strong results for the power generator, cannot be extended to other nonlinear generators.
In this paper we show that our method can also be used to produce new results on the multidimensional distribution of inversive congruential and digital inversive pseudorandom numbers for all initial segments of length N, starting with very small values of N, when the initial value of the generator is selected at random.
Throughout the paper, the implied constants in the symbols 'O' and ' ' may occasionally, where obvious, depend on some integer parameter s ≥ 1 and are absolute otherwise (we recall that A B is equivalent to A = O(B)).
Auxiliary Results
Let us consider the following sequence of rational functions over IF q : 
It suffices to observe that in that lemma we must have
where ψ i denotes the ith iterate of the permutation ψ given by (1 
Lemma 1 For any prime power q, integers c, M, N with M ≥ 1 and 1 ≤ N ≤ T and any nonzero vector
where
Proof. We have
Since ψ is a permutation, the absolute value of the sum over ϑ depends, as a function of k and l, only on d = |k − l|. If d = 0, then the sum over ϑ is equal to q. Therefore
The last sum over ϑ was already considered in [26, eq. (6)]. Therefore, by the inequality at the bottom of p. 194 in [26] and noting (3), we obtain 
and after simple calculations we obtain
We note that the second term in the bound (4) never dominates, thus we have
We also remark that because ψ is a permutation, we get for any integer L,
Therefore, separating the inner sum into at most N/K + 1 subsums of length at most K, for any integer 1 ≤ K ≤ N we have
Thus, selecting K = min{N, q 1/2 } and taking into account that qN
, we obtain the desired result.
We also need the obvious identity
For integers m ≥ 1 and c, let us define
Then we have the easily established inequality
which holds for any integers c, L, and m ≥ Q ≥ 1. For a sequence of N points
where T Γ (B) is the number of points of the sequence Γ which hit the box 
We need the Erdös-Turán-Koksma inequality (see Theorem 1.21 of [3] ) for the discrepancy of a sequence of points of the s-dimensional unit cube, which we present in the following form.
Lemma 2
For any integer G ≥ 1, the discrepancy ∆ Γ of a sequence of points (7) satisfies
where |a|, r(a) are defined by (8) 
We use log to denote the logarithm to the base 2. The number T is defined as in the beginning of Section 2. Let 
B(N, p, T ) =
N −1/2 (log N) s+1 log T if N ≤ p 1/2 , p −1/4 (log N) s+1 log T if N > p 1/2 .
Theorem 3 Let s ≥ 1 be an integer and
Proof. Without loss of generality we can assume that N ≥ 2. From Lemma 2 with G = N/2 we derive
Therefore from (6) we obtain
Applying the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, from Lemma 1 we derive
where we used the standard bound for partial sums of the harmonic series in the last step. Thus, for each k = 1, . . . , log T , the inequality 
. , log T is O(εp).
For all other ϑ, we get from (9),
for 1 ≤ N ≤ T , where we used m k = 2m k−1 < 2N in the last step.
Discrepancy Bound for Digital Inversive Pseudorandom Numbers
For the generation of digital inversive pseudorandom numbers we let q = p r with a (small) prime p and an integer r ≥ 2. Let u 0 (ϑ), u 1 (ϑ), . . . be the sequence of elements of IF q generated by (1) and (2) These pseudorandom numbers were introduced by Eichenauer-Herrmann and Niederreiter [8] . It is obvious that if t is the least period of the sequence u 0 (ϑ), u 1 (ϑ), . . ., then the sequence x 0 (ϑ), x 1 (ϑ), . . . is purely periodic with least period t. Let s ≥ 1 be an integer. We denote by D 
We define the number T as in the beginning of Section 2 and put 
Proof. We can again assume that N ≥ 2. For any initial value ϑ ∈ IF q we first proceed as in the proof of [26, Theorem 7] . Let C * s×r (p) be the set of all nonzero s × r matrices whose entries are integers from the interval (−p/2, p/2]. For H ∈ C * s×r (p) let the positive weight W p (H) be defined as on p. 197 of [26] . Then by [26, eq . (13)] we have 
From the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and Lemma 1 we obtain
If we note also that
The proof is now completed as in Theorem 3.
Remarks
Theorems 3 and 4 yield a nontrivial discrepancy bound whenever N is at least of the order of magnitude (log p) 2s+2+θ , respectively (log q) 2s+2+θ , for some θ > 0. We remark that the bound in [14] for inversive congruential pseudorandom numbers, namely
which holds for all initial values ϑ and 1 ≤ N ≤ t where t ≤ T is the period of the corresponding sequence, is nontrivial only for N at least of the order of magnitude p 1/2 (log p) 2s+θ . A similar statement holds with regard to the bound D in [26] for digital inversive pseudorandom numbers. In the case of greatest practical interest, namely when t = p in the inversive congruential method and t = q in the digital inversive method, Theorems 3 and 4 can also be interpreted as discrepancy bounds for "almost all" segments of length N in a given sequence of inversive congruential, respectively digital inversive, pseudorandom numbers. It should be of interest to apply our technique to some other similar inversive generators such as those of [23, 26, 29, 30, 31] ; see also the survey [28] . Unfortunately, for another important class of pseudorandom number generators, namely for polynomial generators, our method does not give any significant improvement on the "individual" results of [24] .
We remark that our method works for generators modulo a composite number as well. But one should expect weaker results because instead of the very powerful Weil bound which is implicit in the proof of Lemma 1, one will have to use bounds on exponential sums with composite denominator which are essentially weaker; see [15, 16, 32] .
